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TRANSFORMING THE U.S. GLOBAL DEFENSE POSTURE
Ryan Henry
At the end of 2004, the world was witness to an event that no one could haveforeseen. Even more startling than the shock of the Indian Ocean tsunami
itself was the scale of its impact. But the very suddenness and speed with which
the tsunami struck gave a glimpse of how valuable it is to posture our forces for
uncertainty. Had the tsunami occurred in 1985, at the height of the Cold War, it
is difficult to imagine that the United States could have surged the forces and lo-
gistical support needed to deliver food and water to the areas of the eastern In-
dian Ocean that were the hardest hit. It is even more difficult to imagine that the
United States could have depended on an extensive network of partner nations
to assist us in exercising our global responsibility to act. Only through the trans-
formation of the U.S. military’s capabilities and the growing flexibility of our
overseas posture was the United States able to respond as quickly and effectively
as it did during this crisis.
The security environment at the start of the twenty-first century is perhaps
the most uncertain it has been in our nation’s history. This article focuses on the
strategic realities that are driving the transformation of the American global de-
fense posture to contend with that uncertainty, and the resultant changes the
Department of Defense is working to bring about in our relationships and part-
nership capabilities around the world.
NEW STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE
The impetus for the transformation that put us in a position to respond quickly
and effectively to the Indian Ocean tsunami was the emergence of a new strate-
gic landscape. Since 2002, the U.S. military has been adapting the posture of its
forces to address the key security challenges that our country will face in the
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twenty-first century. Traditional, state-based military challenges—for which
our Cold War posture was optimized—will remain, but as the 11 September
2001 attacks revealed, a broader range of security challenges has emerged. The
events of 9/11 showed the destructive potential of terrorists and the vulnerabil-
ity of the United States and of its allies to unwarned attack. It showed the effec-
tiveness of asymmetric methods in countering U.S. conventional military
superiority and sounded an early warning of the approaching confluence of terror-
ism, state sponsorship of terrorism, and proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction (WMD) enabled by globalization. It focused our attention on a hostile
ideology that openly advocates the killing of innocents for political gain, and it
proved that globalization has made failed states and ungoverned areas in the
most remote corners of the world grave dangers to our security.
The Secretary of Defense’s 2005 National Defense Strategy provides a concep-
tual framework for understanding this new strategic landscape, which may be
said to span four types of security challenges: traditional, irregular, catastrophic,
and disruptive.
• Traditional: states employing military forces in well-known forms of
military competition and conflict (such as major combat operations
employing conventional air, sea, and land forces)
• Irregular: nonstate and state actors employing “unconventional” methods
to counter stronger state opponents (for instance, terrorism, insurgency,
civil war, and other methods aimed to erode influence and political will)
• Catastrophic: terrorists or rogue states employing WMD or WMD-like
effects against American interests (for example, massive attacks on the
homeland, collapsing global markets, or loss of key allies that would inflict
a state of shock upon political and commercial activity)
• Disruptive: competitors employing breakout technologies or methods that
counter or cancel our military superiority (e.g., advances in bio-, cyber-, or
space war, ultra-miniaturization, directed energy).
As recent experience has shown, these challenges often converge and overlap.
Our adversaries in Iraq and Afghanistan have employed both traditional and ir-
regular approaches, and terrorist organizations like al-Qa‘ida are posing irregu-
lar threats while actively seeking catastrophic capabilities.
THE BROAD VIEW OF “TRANSFORMATION”
President Bush came to office in 2001 with an aggressive agenda for defense
transformation. He charged Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld with trans-
forming the Defense Department for the challenges of the twenty-first century.
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The administration’s sense of the changed strategic landscape led to a new assess-
ment of our needed global defense posture. What is emerging from that as-
sessment is the most profound reordering of U.S. military forces overseas since
World War II and the Korean War. The key to understanding this realignment ef-
fort is transformation.
When he arrived at the Pentagon, Secretary Rumsfeld recognized the need for
change. He understood that the strategic and operational environment today is
defined by uncertainty, that the world is changing in relation to that environment,
and that we need to view that world as it is and adapt to it as necessary. The
threat-based planning system prevalent in the Cold War—through which we
could project a seemingly predefined and predetermined Soviet threat and how to
posture against it—had become obsolete. Overcoming our preconceptions of that
era, Secretary Rumsfeld led the department in taking the first step of transforma-
tion by shifting away from threat-based planning and toward a capabilities-based
approach that addresses the full spectrum of feasible threats. This approach posits
that unlike in the Cold War, we no longer know precisely what threats we will face
in the future, who will pose them, and where, much less when. However, we do be-
lieve there will be future challengers to American interests and to the interests of
our allies and partners, and that we must plan against the kinds of capabilities po-
tential adversaries may employ to exploit our vulnerabilities.
Revisiting the framework of the four security challenges, this approach
means first recognizing that the Defense Department’s (and the nation’s) com-
fort zone has long been in the realm of “traditional challenges.” Through trans-
formation, the department has moved beyond this traditional focus and begun
applying its thinking and capabilities to the other three sets of challenges—
irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive. Our global defense posture realignment
will leave us in much better shape to face the uncertainty that inheres within
these nontraditional challenges.
Our sense of the new strategic landscape—and the opportunities opened up
by emerging technologies—has led to a new way of measuring military effective-
ness. Numbers of troops and weapon platforms are no longer the key metrics.
Rather, military effectiveness is now a matter of capabilities—speed, stealth,
reach, knowledge, precision, and lethality. Thus, our defense planning should
place less emphasis on numbers of forward forces than upon capabilities and de-
sired effects that can be achieved rapidly.
Transformation also calls for increased effectiveness and efficiency. Within
the Defense Department, it has strengthened jointness among military services
through joint presence policy, as well as smarter business practices for man-
aging the day-to-day workings of the institution. At the interagency level, it
has improved transparency and generated new approaches to problem solving.
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Transformation has also strengthened momentum for changing the relationship
between the department and its people, by keeping faith with their expectations
of quality of life in a time of increased operational tempo.
If changing relationships is a hallmark of transformation, the greatest impact
of all has been on American relationships with allies and partners. The adminis-
tration understands that the United States cannot “go it alone” in world affairs.
Among our country’s key strategic assets is the network of alliances and partner-
ships that allows us to enjoy the benefits of international cooperation in virtu-
ally every endeavor we undertake. This network is the most vital asset we have as
a nation in the Global War on Terror. It is instrumental in developing a common
understanding of shared threats and in working jointly to contend with them,
particularly through partnership capacity building.
We call the relationships dimension of transformation security cooperation. It
is important to understand that this term is not synonymous with “engage-
ment”—or with showing the U.S. flag overseas as an end in itself. Rather, secu-
rity cooperation is the means by which the Department of Defense encourages
and enables allies and partners to work with us to achieve common strategic ob-
jectives, thereby building the capability and capacity of the partnership.
In a sense, security cooperation is capabilities-based planning as applied to
relationships with our allies and partners. Whereas during the Cold War we
supported our NATO and Pacific Rim allies against threats to their borders, to-
day we work with allies and partners who share our sense that security chal-
lenges transcend specific borders and threaten societies on a global scale. Just as
capabilities-based planning positions the United States to contend with ad-
versarial capabilities in an uncertain environment, security cooperation enables
the United States to confront a spectrum of threats to its own security and that of
allies and partners—anywhere, at any time. This invokes an important, symbiotic
relationship between security cooperation and our global defense posture. Global
posture serves as the platform for implementing security cooperation activities.
Conversely, security cooperation activities help develop and maintain the access
needed for posturing our forces to contend with future uncertainties.
In sum, transformation is far more dynamic than the common conception of
applying high technology in war. For the Defense Department, it is about:
• A command climate that swept away preconceived notions of strategic
affairs and of the department’s traditional role in those affairs
• The shift from a threat-based to a capabilities-based approach
• The need for increased efficiency and effectiveness
• The shift from engagement to security cooperation.
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Transformational thinking respects the facts, rejects fixed ideas, and promotes
new and necessary relationships and capabilities that position us to contend
with the uncertainty of the new strategic landscape.
THE GENESIS OF THE U.S. GLOBAL DEFENSE POSTURE
Before turning to how this transformation has helped drive the strategy for re-
aligning our global defense posture, a bit of history is in order. In 1985, at the
height of the Cold War, the United States had 358,000 military personnel de-
ployed in Europe, 125,000 in East Asia, and nine thousand in the Persian Gulf. In
Europe, ground, air, and naval forces were stationed in support of NATO from
Iceland in the northwest to Turkey in the southeast. In the Pacific region, forces
were stationed in Korea, the Philippines, and Japan. Our defense posture at that
time was the product of the collective legacy of the wars of the mid-twentieth
century, but our basing and operating patterns were relatively well matched to
the challenges of the Cold War era. Forces in Europe and Asia were primarily de-
signed to fight in place—potent for defensive operations close to garrison, but
difficult to deploy outside of the theater where they were stationed. Essentially,
we maintained forward-deployed forces that served as defensive tripwires.
The end of the Cold War dramatically altered the global landscape. As a re-
sult, during the first half of the 1990s the United States closed or turned over to
host governments about 60 percent of its overseas military installations and re-
turned nearly three hundred thousand military personnel to the United States.
During the 1990s the United States also closed large military facilities in the
Philippines, Spain, and Panama.
By the mid-1990s, although we had dramatically reduced the overall numbers
of forward-stationed military forces, they remained concentrated largely in
Western Europe and Northeast Asia. After the end of the Cold War, however, our
operating patterns had diverged from our basing posture. Western Europe and
Northeast Asia had become springboards for operations in the Balkans, the Per-
sian Gulf, and later, Central Asia. The result was a shift in the rationale for our
forward posture—forces were no longer expected to fight in place. Rather, their
purpose was to project into theaters that were likely to be some distance away
from their garrisons. In other words, while a primary purpose of forward pres-
ence was to provide for the direct territorial defense of treaty allies, this could no
longer be the sole purpose. Threats to the security of our nation and that of our
allies had begun emerging in unexpected and faraway lands.
However, new necessities of geopolitics and operational flexibility overseas
were not the only motivations for transforming our global posture. The other
major impetus was domestic in nature. Stresses on our military forces and their
families also dictated that we review our posture globally. “Accompanied tours”
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(in which families moved with the service members) designed in an era of static
deployments had become more of a hardship for families as service members
deployed more frequently from their forward stations. In increasing numbers,
accompanying dependents faced “double separation”—separated both from
their loved ones in uniform and from their communities and extended families
back in the United States.
In his 2001 review of our defense strategy and capabilities, Secretary
Rumsfeld challenged the Department of Defense to change how it conceptual-
ized and projected American presence overseas so as to contend with uncer-
tainty and surprise. Some remained unconvinced of the need for change, but the
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 abruptly dispelled any doubt. No one
foresaw this catastrophic event, but our administration had already made the
mental leap—expect uncertainty and surprise—inherently necessary to re-
spond effectively. The attacks coincided in a tragic manner with the defense
transformation already under way.
The confluence of these transformational factors—the president’s sense of
the new strategic landscape, the mandate for change from the 2001 review, and
the shock of 9/11—galvanized the forces of change. In the midst of these co-
alescing events, the secretary of defense initiated the Global Defense Posture
Review, a comprehensive, strategy-based reassessment of the size, location,
types, and capabilities of our forward military forces. We surveyed the new stra-
tegic landscape and developed a global posture strategy that hinged upon
achieving geopolitically sound relationships and a disposition of relevant capa-
bilities forward to contend with uncertainty. This strategy was developed
through a wide range of consultations—with policy makers and military leaders
throughout the department, within the interagency realm, and with defense in-
tellectuals. The secretary then turned to his combatant commanders* to devise
specific proposals for posture changes to implement the strategy. This ensured
that what seemed strategically sound could be made operationally feasible. The
development of these proposals largely revolved around three general areas of
realignment:
• Adjusting our presence in Europe by shifting away from legacy Cold War
structures
• Reforming our posture in the Pacific, with increased emphasis on key
capabilities to assure allies more effectively, dissuade potential competitors,
deter aggressors, and defeat adversaries if called upon to do so
1 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
* The combatant commanders, who report through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the
secretary of defense, are currently those of the U.S. Central, European, Joint Forces, Northern, Pa-
cific, Southern, Special Operations, Strategic, and Transportation commands. See www.jcs.mil.
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• Developing the operational flexibility and diversity in options needed to
contend with uncertainty in the “arc of instability”—the vast region from
North Africa across the Middle East and South Asia to Southeast Asia.
In 2002, the president confirmed the change of direction in defense planning in
the National Security Strategy of the United States: “To contend with uncertainty and
to meet the many security challenges we face, the United States will require bases
and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as tem-
porary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of U.S. forces.”
The Defense Department’s strategy was exported to the U.S. government as a
whole, so that the Global Defense Posture Review would not be driven just by
military considerations. The Defense Department collaborated closely with its
interagency partners—particularly the State Department—from the start. The
National Security Council, as the body overseeing posture changes, provided
high-level guidance and input. Thus the global defense posture realignment be-
came the strategy of the U.S. government.
The Defense Department also consulted extensively with allies and partners.
In November 2003 the president formally announced intensified consultations
with allies and partners on the Global Defense Posture Review. Subsequently, se-
nior Defense and State officials held joint consultations in over twenty foreign
capitals, many of which are still going on in various forms.
GLOBAL POSTURE STRATEGY UNVEILED
On 16 August 2004, in a culminating point for Defense Department planners,
the secretary’s new global defense posture strategy, molded by interagency in-
put, was adopted by the president in an announcement of the administration’s
intention to move forward: “Today I announce a new plan for deploying Amer-
ica’s armed forces. . . . The new plan will help us fight and win the wars of the 21st
century. It will strengthen our alliances around the world while we build new
partnerships to better preserve the peace.”
While the global posture strategy does not comprise everything the American
defense establishment is doing overseas, its implementation serves as the foun-
dation for changing U.S. defense policy abroad. It is the department’s vehicle for
translating transformation into relevant and effective defense relationships and
capabilities for the emerging security environment. The global defense posture
strategy is composed of five key themes, which emerged from the review and the
evolving transformational thinking of the department described earlier. These
themes now serve as the measures of effectiveness for global posture changes.
Improve Flexibility to Contend with Uncertainty. Much of our existing over-
seas posture was established during the Cold War, when we thought we knew
H E N R Y 1 9
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where we would have to fight. Today, however, we often have to deploy to places
that few people, if anyone, would have predicted. Thus, we should plan in ways
that mitigate surprise. Our goal is to have forces positioned forward on a con-
tinual basis, with access and facilities that enable them to reach any potential
crisis spot quickly.
Strengthen Allied Roles and Build New Partnerships. Changes to our global
posture aim to help our allies and friends modernize their own forces, strategies,
and doctrines. We are exploring ways in which we can enhance our collective de-
fense capabilities, ensuring that our future alliances and partnerships are capa-
ble, affordable, sustainable, and relevant. At the same time, we seek to tailor our
military’s overseas “footprint” to suit local conditions, reduce friction with host
nations, and respect local sensitivities. A critical precept in our global posture
planning is that the United States will place forces only where those forces are
wanted and welcomed by the host government and populace.
Create the Capacity to Act Both within and across Regions. In the Cold War years,
we focused on threats to specific regions and tailored our military presence to
those regions. Now we are dealing with security challenges that are global in na-
ture, relationships that must address those challenges accordingly (e.g., Japan’s in-
volvement in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, or NATO’s involvement through the
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan), and defense capabilities
that must be global in reach. We need to improve our ability to project power from
one region to another and to manage forces on a global basis.
Develop Rapidly Deployable Capabilities. We no longer expect to have to fight
in place. Our forces need to be able to move smoothly into, through, and out of
host nations. This puts a premium on establishing flexible legal and support ar-
rangements with our allies and partners. It also strengthens the demand for ca-
pabilities that provide increasingly global reach, such as the Army’s Stryker
brigade combat teams, the worldwide disposition of key prepositioned materi-
als and equipment, and improvements to global en route infrastructure and
strategic lift.
Focus on Effective Military Capabilities—Not Numbers of Personnel, Units, or
Equipment. Our key purpose is to push relevant capabilities forward—capabil-
ity being defined as the ability to achieve desired effects under certain standards
and conditions. We now can have far greater capabilities forward than in the
past, even with smaller permanently stationed forces. The Cold War practice of
“bean counting” numbers of personnel in administrative regions is no longer
the case. Capabilities matter, not numbers.
2 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Spring 2006\Ventura\NWC Review Spring 2006.vp
Tuesday, April 11, 2006 8:22:33 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
8
Naval War College Review, Vol. 59 [2006], No. 2, Art. 4
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss2/4
A COMPLEX UNDERTAKING
The implementation process for realigning our global defense posture is an
enormously complex undertaking. These changes are not happening in a static
environment. Global posture is a dynamic, rolling process that incorporates the
transformational mind-set described earlier—continuously assessing the
geopolitical environment, incorporating new ideas into the strategy, and mak-
ing adjustments as necessary.
The key to understanding this dynamic undertaking is the recognition that
global posture is not monolithic—not just a matter of the physical military foot-
print of bases and personnel overseas. It includes:
• Our relationships with host nations
• The presence of activities overseas
• The legal arrangements needed to support that presence
• Our capacity to surge forces
• Our prepositioned equipment
• The global sourcing (or “force management”) needed to meet competing
demands.
The interrelationship among these posture elements is akin to an ecosystem.
This “ecosystem” (see figure) is defined by interdependent layers of political,
geographic, and operational access that enable security cooperation and prompt
global military action when needed. Changes on one level can have secondary
and tertiary effects on others. For example, changes in the legal arrangements
(an element of political access) that we have with one host nation can affect our
freedom of action (geographic access) throughout a theater and, consequently,
our ability to push relevant capabilities forward for operations. Achieving and
sustaining good political access through our relationships with host-nation
partners ensures the desired geographic access and, subsequently, the desired
operational access to rotate forces in theater for security cooperation activities
or to surge forces when needed in support of contingency operations. The chal-
lenge for global posture, which is akin to adjusting that ecosystem deliberately, is
in striking the right balance between our relationships and capabilities overseas
on the one hand and the dynamics of the complex and changing security envi-
ronment on the other.
Each of these layers of access deserves a closer look.
Political Access
Building and sustaining political access—that is, the will of host-nation allies
and partners to support U.S. military action when needed—require two posture
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elements: relationships and legal arrangements. Our ability to act around the
world is supported by key security relationships with allies and partners. These
relationships involve interactions at all levels—from heads of state to students
studying together in the schoolhouses that we and our allies provide. Changes in
global posture seek both to strengthen our existing relationships and to help cul-
tivate new relationships founded upon common security interests and common
values. These are critical to enhancing allied and partner military capabilities in
key areas, such as counterterrorism.
The set of bilateral and multilateral legal arrangements pertaining to our mil-
itary personnel and activities worldwide constitutes the formal framework for
our military presence, access, and activities in other countries. It defines the
rights and obligations of the parties, sets the terms for military access and activi-
ties, and provides protections for American personnel. Some of our planned pos-
ture changes require a foundation of new and more flexible legal arrangements.
Our new legal arrangements tend to be more concise than the elaborate arrange-
ments we entered into after World War II, addressing only key things the United
States needs for an expeditionary (rather than permanent) presence. These
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include operational flexibility, training, logistics, financial arrangements, and
status coverage for our forces. Critical to our success in this effort has been close
collaboration by the State and Defense departments to develop a solid inter-
agency team and a good diplomatic structure for consultations and
negotiations.
Geographic Access
Geographic access means having the necessary en route infrastructure to main-
tain our freedom of action globally; in posture planning it requires considerable
versatility in overseas facilities where our forces live, train, and operate. The re-
alignment of our global defense posture combines a network of traditional and
new facilities to enhance our capacity for prompt global action. This network
consists of three types of facilities—main operating bases (MOBs), forward oper-
ating sites (FOSs), and cooperative security locations (CSLs).
Main operating bases, with permanently stationed combat forces, have ro-
bust infrastructures such as family support facilities and strengthened arrange-
ments for force protection. Examples include Ramstein Air Base in Germany,
Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, and Camp Humphreys in Korea. We are retaining
and consolidating many of our MOBs in Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom,
Japan, Korea, and elsewhere. We also rely heavily on forward operating sites, ex-
pandable “warm facilities”maintained with a limited U.S. military support pres-
ence, and, possibly, prepositioned equipment. Greater use of prepositioned
equipment, strategically located and globally managed, will support training
with our allies and partners and facilitate the rapid deployment of forces where
and when they are needed. FOSs largely support rotational rather than perma-
nently stationed forces and are focuses for bilateral and regional training. Exam-
ples include the Sembawang port facility in Singapore and Soto Cano Air Base in
Honduras.
We also will need access to a broader range of facilities with little or no per-
manent American presence. Relying instead on periodic service, contractor, or
host-nation support, cooperative security locations provide contingency access
and serve as focal points for security cooperation activities. A good example is
Dakar, Senegal, where the Air Force has negotiated contingency landing, logis-
tics, and fuel contracting arrangements, and which served as a staging area for
the 2003 peace operation in Liberia. A June 2005 Atlantic Monthly article by
Robert Kaplan discusses presence in the Pacific in a way that captures the idea
behind CSLs:
We will want unobtrusive bases that benefit the host country much more obviously
than they benefit us. Allowing us the use of such a base would ramp up power from a
country rather than humiliating it. . . . Often the key role in managing a CSL is
H E N R Y 2 3
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played by a private contractor[,] . . . [u]sually a retired American noncom. . . . He
rents his facilities at the base from the host country military, and then charges a fee to
the U.S. Air Force pilots transiting the base. Officially he is in business for himself,
which the host country likes because it can then claim it is not really working with
the American military. . . . [T]he very fact that a relationship with the U.S. armed
forces is indirect rather than direct eases tensions.
Operational Access
Finally, operational access comprises the presence, global management, and
surging of our forces overseas, all enabled by the political and geographic access
we enjoy with host-nation partners. Presence is defined by the permanent and
rotational forces that conduct military activities (training, exercises, and opera-
tions) worldwide, from security cooperation to crisis response. That presence
consists of both small units working together in a wide range of capacities and
major formations conducting elaborate exercises to achieve proficiency in multi-
national operations. Second, our posture supports our new approach to force
management, which seeks both to relieve stresses on our military forces and
their families and to manage our forces on a global, rather than regional, basis.
Combatant commanders no longer “own” forces in their theaters; rather, forces
are managed according to global priorities. Third, managing our military forces
globally also allows us to surge a greater percentage of the force wherever and
whenever necessary.
Tempo of Global Posture Changes
There is another dimension of global posture that underscores its multidimen-
sional nature: the cycle of interdependent processes at work in the Defense De-
partment—a cycle that sets the pace for posture changes, including institutional
transformation within the services, the U.S. government’s deliberations with
host-nation partners, and the Base Closure and Realignment (known as BRAC)
process. Global posture’s flexible, rolling decision-making process must ebb and
flow with these three processes.
Specifically, the process of consultations and negotiations with allies and
partners establishes a tempo for bringing American forces home. Over the next
ten years, from sixty to seventy thousand military personnel (along with approx-
imately a hundred thousand family members and civilian employees) are to re-
turn to the United States from overseas installations. This realignment will also
entail a net reduction of approximately 35 percent in our overseas facilities.
The pace for these changes is set through a deliberative diplomatic process
with current and potential host-nation partners in which we achieve common
understandings of the security environment, develop plans that ensure mutual
benefits and reliable defense commitments, and work to reduce any frictions
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attending upon the U.S. military presence. Multiple variables in negotiations—
such as host-nation stability and sensitivity to American presence, security chal-
lenges in the region, and existing levels of host-nation infrastructure and cost
sharing—are weighed across a diverse range of countries and regions.
U.S. forces that relocate as a result of this diplomatic process will be affected
by the absorptive capacity of service transformation efforts and by BRAC. The
planned posture changes directly support service initiatives—such as the
Army’s modularity and unit rotation concepts, the Navy’s Fleet Response Plan,
and the Air Force’s ongoing force management improvements—designed to fa-
cilitate personnel management, provide predictability in scheduling, and offer
more stability at home. Returning forces meet the services’ need to refit their
units for increased modularity. These transformed units then provide the com-
bat power for prosecuting operations in the Global War on Terror, including
Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. Of course, the absorp-
tive capacity of returning units is also directly impacted by BRAC, which sets the
pace for reconstitution of those forces in the continental United States.
Thus, a symbiotic relationship exists among global posture consultations/
negotiations overseas, service transformation, and BRAC, in which each
informs and dictates the pace of the others. Imagine a clock running on three
wheels, each wheel’s gears interlocked with the others. Slowing one wheel would
slow the entire clockwork, thereby impeding the pace of transformation to sup-
port the war on terror and enable our long-term realignment effort.
REGION-BY-REGION SYNOPSIS
Europe
Peace in Europe is no longer threatened by an enemy with tens of thousands of
armored vehicles poised to invade across the North German plain. We no longer need
heavy maneuver forces as the central element of our defense posture in Europe. A
transformed posture—one that supports NATO’s own transformation goals—
requires forward forces that are rapidly deployable for early entry into conflict
well beyond Europe. Such forces will continue to train alongside other NATO
forces to improve interoperability for twenty-first-century operations.
There are two basic components to posture changes in Europe: increasing ro-
tational presence toward the south and east of Europe, and pushing the most ef-
fective and relevant capabilities forward for expeditionary presence and
spurring allied transformation. Our future posture in Europe will be character-
ized by lighter, more deployable ground capabilities (for example, Stryker and
airborne forces). Such ground forces will have leaner command and support
structures than they have today. They will rely on existing advanced training
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facilities (such as in Grafenwoehr, Germany) and high-capacity mobility infra-
structure (in Ramstein, Germany, for instance). Special Operations forces will
play an increasingly important role in our future European posture. They will be
repositioned in the theater for training and operational efficiencies and for ease
of movement. Our naval and air capabilities in the theater will remain very ro-
bust and will enable rapid movement of forces into, through, and from Europe.
They too have already undergone transformations to leaner and more deploy-
able command structures.
The Asia-Pacific
In the Asia-Pacific region, we seek to strengthen our ability to execute the Na-
tional Defense Strategy and to solidify relationships that can help win the Global
War on Terror. We want to improve our ability to meet our alliance commit-
ments by strengthening our deterrent against threats such as that posed by
North Korea while helping our allies strengthen their own military capabilities.
The forward deployment of additional expeditionary maritime capabilities and
long-range strike assets in Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam will increase both our de-
terrent effect and our capacity for rapid response. In this region—in light of the
vast distances that military forces must traverse in crises—deterrence also
means increasing our ability to project military forces rapidly and at long
ranges, both to the region and within it. Where appropriate, we also will consoli-
date our facilities and headquarters for more streamlined command and control
and increased jointness. This facilitates a more expeditionary posture, as is the
case with the transformation of the U.S. Army’s Japan headquarters into a de-
ployable joint task force–capable headquarters. Finally, we seek to reduce the
number of American military forces in host nations where those forces abut
large urban populations. We will strengthen our relationships by reducing the
frictions—accidents, incidents, and the like—associated with normal military
activities in urban settings.
In a related initiative, over the past two years we have engaged with our Japa-
nese hosts in a series of sustained security consultations. These talks were aimed
at evolving the U.S.-Japan security alliance to reflect today’s rapidly changing
global security environment. The Defense Posture Review Initiative (DPRI) has
focused on alliance transformation at the strategic and operational levels, with
particular attention to the posture of U.S. and Japanese forces in Japan. In the
DPRI, we have negotiated several important force realignment initiatives de-
signed to relieve stresses in our relationship with Japan while strengthening our
deterrence and global flexibility. Among the more significant of these initiatives
are the consolidation of carrier jet aircraft based on mainland Japan, and a sig-
nificant reduction and reorganization of the Marine Corps posture on Okinawa.
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Our current ground, air, and naval access throughout the Asia-Pacific region
serves as a basis for a long-term presence that will be better structured for more
effective regional and global action. For example, the Army’s modular transfor-
mation will streamline headquarters elements and strengthen joint capabilities.
The forward-deployed Air Force Strike ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and re-
connaissance) task force in the Pacific will also enable greater regional and
global reach. We also are establishing a network of forward operating sites and
cooperative security locations to support better the war on terror and to provide
multiple avenues of access for contingency operations. Such facilities will serve
to expand U.S. and host-nation training opportunities, helping our partners
build their own capacities in areas such as counterterrorism.
On the Korean Peninsula, our planned enhancements and realignments are
intended to strengthen our overall military effectiveness for the combined de-
fense of the Republic of Korea. Stationed forces are relocating away from the in-
creasing congestion and sprawl of the greater Seoul area and consolidating into
two major hubs in the central and southern sections of the country. Rotational
and rapidly deployable combat capabilities such as Stryker units and air expedi-
tionary forces will complement these permanently stationed units. We seek to
retain a robust prepositioned equipment capability in Korea to support rapid
reinforcement.
The Middle East
In the Middle East, we seek to maintain a posture of “presence without perma-
nence”—prosecuting the Global War on Terror and assuring our allies and part-
ners, but without unduly heavy military footprints. Cooperation and access
provided by host nations during ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM pro-
vide us with a solid basis for long-term, cooperative relationships in this region.
We seek to maintain or upgrade—and in isolated cases establish—forward op-
erating sites and cooperative security locations for rotational and contingency
purposes, along with strategically placed prepositioned equipment and forward
command-and-control elements. Our posture also aims to strengthen our capa-
bilities on the peripheries of this region, including in the Horn of Africa and in
Central and South Asia. In addition, we continue to identify advanced training
opportunities with our regional partners for capacity building in such areas as
counterterrorism and for broader military interoperability.
Africa and the Western Hemisphere
Our aims in Africa and the Western Hemisphere are to broaden relationships,
build partnership capacity, obtain contingency access, and facilitate practical se-
curity cooperation activities, without creation of new bases or permanent mili-
tary presence.
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Ungoverned and undergoverned areas in vast swaths of sub-Saharan Africa
and South America can serve as breeding grounds not just for domestic insur-
gents but for international terrorists and other transnational threats that in-
creasingly find their “home bases” disappearing in other regions. We therefore
seek an array of CSLs in these regions for contingency access into remote areas.
Often this access will take the form of “gas and go” operations, as has been recent
practice as formalized in the Air Force’s Africa Fuels Initiative. Such CSLs will
not require a permanent combat presence. They will be focal points for com-
bined training with host nations and other allies and partners, and they will have
the capacity to expand and contract on the basis of operational needs.
Though much work remains, the realignment of the U.S. global defense posture
is well under way, particularly through the ongoing strengthening of American
military capabilities in Europe and the Pacific. The 1st Infantry Division has
commenced its redeployment from Germany. A brigade from the 2nd Infantry
Division in the Republic of Korea will redeploy to the United States upon com-
pletion of its rotation in Iraq. In Japan, the DPRI process has resulted in an
agreement on specific force posture realignments that will have far-reaching,
beneficial impacts for the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Also, the services are under-
going expansive transformation and consolidation of their headquarters struc-
tures, the better to support expeditionary operations.
The new U.S. global posture strategy is set to emerge as one of the most
far-reaching of the national defense legacies of this administration. It reflects the
American commitment to a global insurance policy for an emerging security
landscape. Collectively, proposed posture changes provide a framework for our
alliance and defense commitments overseas and for harmonizing our forces’
skill sets with the shifting uncertainties of that new landscape. Global,
geopolitical circumstances will continue to change, our relationships with allies
and partners will evolve, and our capabilities will mature. Well beyond the ten-
ure of this administration, our new global defense posture will provide a foun-
dation upon which the U.S. military and its supporting defense establishment
can build adaptively for decades to come.
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